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IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805. By Peter Charles Hoffer and
N.E.H. Hull New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1984. Pp.
xiv, 325. $30.

The legislature's power to impeach, although rarely exercised, provides perhaps the most powerful weapon available to any branch of
the federal govemment. 1 The proceedings initiated against President
Nixon in 1974 fQcused the attention of many legal scholars on the
origins and functions ofimpeachment.2 A few cases were well-known,
most notably the nineteenth-century impeachments of President Andrew Johnson and Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. But the origins of the device, and the circumstances surrounding its importation
from England to America, were not as clear. Most scholars assumed
that the Framers derived the idea of impeachment directly from English law. 3 However, as Peter Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull4 convincingly demonstrate in Impeachment in America, 1635-1805, the
Constitution's formula for iiµpeachment was not merely an adoption
of English practice. Rather, American impeachment has a distinctly
American flavor, developed from the early experience of the colonies
examining the issue. Still, his reflections on these questions lend valuable perspective on the
narrower analysis which occupies the bulk of the work.
1. The main constitutional provision for impeachment reads:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.
U.S. CoNST., art. II, § 4.
2. See, e.g.• c. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT (1974); J. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
(1978).
.
3. For a thorough modern analysis of the Constitution's impeachment formula, see R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973). Berger attempts to determine
the intent of the Framers in article II, section 4, largely by reference to English impeachment
law.
4. Peter Charles Hoffer is an associate professor of history at the University of Georgia.
N.E.H. Hull formerly served on the faculty at the University of Georgia and Vanderbilt University, and is currently attending law school.
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and modified by experimentation in state constitutional law prior to
the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
Despite their thesis, the authors begin their tale in England. Impeachment originated in the fourteenth century in the House of Commons, with trial in the House of Lords. The Commons could impeach
for a variety of offenses, r~nging from treason to trespass. Contrary to
the American model, anyone could be impeached, even private citizens. Also contrary to the American scheme, a variety of penalties
could be imposed, including (in rare cases) capital punishment.
Although in theory anyone could be impeached by the Commons for
any reason, in practice impeachment was reserved for offenses perceived to endanger the government, or the public's trust in
government.
Hoffer and Hull report that impeachment in America "began almost inadvertently . . . as a practical, local response to apparent misconduct in a high place" (p. 15). The first case involved Virginia's
colonial governor, John Harvey, who after a clash with political adversaries was accused of various fiscal abuses of public power. Several
articles describing Harvey's misconduct were prepared, and the governor was sent to England to be tried. But as subjects of the Crown, the
colonists had no power to remove Harvey from office; the governor
thus retained his office without undergoing the ordeal of trial before
the Lords.
This initial failure did not effectively deter the colonists. Several
legislative attempts to remove government officials in Maryland resulted in trial before that colony's upper house. Similar cases arose
before the end of the seventeenth century in Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and again in Virginia. The authors contend that these cases,
although a deviation from the established English precedent that only
the House of Commons could impeach, do not represent a conscious
attempt by colonial legislators to expand their power base. Rather, the
colonists grasped impeachment as an expedient method of controlling
official misconduct. Hoffer and Hull insist that colonial managers
"did not know that only the Commons could impeach" (p. 27).
This conclusion is speculative, given the sparse documentation attending most early efforts at impeachment in America. More important to the authors' argument, however, are the eighteenth-century
cases. Tighter controls exerted by the Crown over colonial lawmaking
authority deterred American impeachments somewhat during the first
half of that century. A few cases were brought, but all resulted in
failure or appeal to English authority. The authors succeed in drawing a few conclusions about the development of American impeachment doctrine from these aborted cases, but their efforts appear
strained - England's asserted legal supremacy over the colonies dur-
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ing this period effectively stifled the development of an independent
American approach to impeachment.
As the Revolution approached, however, the colonists became
more willing to flout English authority. Legislatures in several colonies openly clashed with royal governors. A typical and significant
example took place in Massachusetts, where the lower house of the
legislature impeached Peter Oliver, the recently appointed chief justice
of the colony's General Court. The crux of the struggle was not official wrongdoing but rather a conflict between the legislature and the
royal governor over control of the judiciary. Both the house and the
governor claimed to be the only lawful source of the justice's salary.
When Oliver accepted the Crown's money, the legislature impeached.
At first glance, Oliver's case, involving an overtly political struggle
for control, seems far removed from the seventeenth-century impeachments for official misconduct. For Hoffer and Hull, however, the revolutionary impeachments reveal an important trend in the use of
impeachment in America. As support for revolution increased, the
authors argue, the colonists turned to impeachment because they recognized it as an important weapon in the struggle for independence
from the Crown's control. Rather than adopting English impeachment practice, the colonists adapted it to their own ends.
The authors unfold their argument chronologically, in a conscious
attempt to chart the increasing divergence of American and English
impeachment doctrine. Their approach succeeds, particularly when
they describe the tumultuous period of state constitutional development from 1776 to 1787. During that period, the states experimented
with several different formulas for impeachment. Many delegates to
the Constitutional Convention played an important role in the development of the fledgling states' impeachment doctrines. As Hoffer and
Hull point out, several of the Framers themselves experienced close
brushes with impeachment at the state level during this period. The
authors posit that these experiences, not English precedent, planted
the seeds of the federal Constitution's approach to impeachment.
Although the Framers recognized the importance of impeachment as a
method of controlling official misbehavior, they were also aware of its
central danger: its use as a partisan political tool to impose the will of
the majority. The authors thus demonstrate the Framers' intent to
make impeachment an extraordinary device, difficult for the majority
to employ to further purely political ends.
The final section of Impeachment in America recounts the most
famous federal impeachment case of the period: the impeachment and
acquittal of Federalist Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase.
Although this story has been told before, 5 Hoffer and Hull place the
5. See, e.g., J. ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHAsE 159-325 (1980).
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incident in the chronological context of the development of impeachment's role in the federal system. At the same time, they portray the
:flavorful interplay of personalities involved in the impeachment and
the trial itself. The authors employ this storytelling style throughout
the book with grea,t success.
Impeachment in America is one of those unusual books of scholarship that succeeds on two levels; it makes an important contribution to
the literature while at the same time entertaining its readers. Woven
around the novel yet convincing thesis that American impeachment is
an American cre~tion are stories of political scandal, legal combat,
and judicial inebriation. In part this style may stem from the fact that
the authors are historians, not lawyers; at times they seem less interested in the legal significance of their thesis than in the personalities
they describe. Neverth~less, their work also contributes significantly
to an understanding of the role impeachment should play in American
government.

